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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management
Deputy to the DCI for Collection Tasking
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence
Deputy Director for Administration
Deputy Director for Operations
Deputy Director for Science & Technology

FROM: Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

SUBJECT: Security and Management

1. Recently I had the valued opportunity to address your senior staffs and discuss security problems jointly faced by managers and security officials today. I appreciated the experience and hope now that similar sessions will be held by the chain of command so that the vital security message of the moment gets wide distribution. In these meetings, I would encourage that these points be stressed:

- ° The current briefcase/package check program being run by the Federal Protective Officers is not a reaction--or, in the words of some, an overreaction--to the Kampiles case. In fact, except for timing, it has nothing to do with the Kampiles case. Planning for the program goes back 15 months. During this period, the Office has had to deal with 128 cases of improper removal or improper disclosure of classified information. Two of these cases led to the termination of the employees involved. A number of these cases led to suspensions of the employee, i.e., days without pay, for periods ranging from one day to twenty days.
- ° The Office of Security holds to the view in this post Moore/Boyce/Kampiles era that personnel security is still the heart of the

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
matter and maximum resources and attention-- by security officers and managers--must be given to the process of finding and holding the most suitable, risk-free personnel. Toward this end, we will continue to provide the best possible security screening and it may be, from time to time, that a clearance being sought from this Office will be delayed in the interest of quality. In the same vein, the Office will give top priority to reinvestigation activity and polygraph retesting on a five-year cycle. You are aware, I'm sure, of the high value of this unique program.

- A task force in the Office of Security is currently examining all aspects of Agency security, especially those related to personnel security, physical security and information handling security. I believe it is reasonable to assume that the task force recommendations, when approved, will lead to some significant changes in the Agency's security environment. Patience may be necessary as new security techniques are tried and measured against operational requirements. Employee convenience may be lessened in some instances as new security measures are introduced. Through it all, however, the smooth and successful implementation of expected changes will depend upon management support and true application of security as a function of command. You will be fully informed on all new security initiatives which may impact significantly on employee convenience or your resources.
- There is currently underway a document control effort that is especially worthy of senior management's personalized attention. It is the "Sensitive Document Control Program" announced by the DDCI in his memorandum to addressees dated 1 September 1978. While simple in concept, the program nevertheless is vital as a first step in launching a more responsible and comprehensive document control system within the organization. The program seeks to identify the most sensitive and critical documents in each component, to cluster these holdings in maximally secure locations, and to assign personal accountability for them. This effort cannot succeed unless

senior managers interest themselves in the project and support the Records Management Officers and Top Secret Control Officers involved.

- The Agency's Top Secret Control Program is entering a critical year of activity as we try to validate the data base on collateral Top Secret documents and perform a total inventory of those holdings. Again, success here will be a function of the resources devoted to the effort and the management support it gets.
- Of course, the real key to all of this is the individual employee. His/her role cannot be overemphasized. We must maintain an atmosphere within the Agency which motivates each employee toward security goals and consistently reinforces security awareness. Our working environment must include constant reminders that effective security is not a cliche but a sine qua non of intelligence work.

2. I believe any comprehensive program to be truly effective and successful must have feedback. I invite your comments and ideas on how we are progressing and ways we may improve our security system.


Robert W. Gambino

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